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The examples given here are intended to illustrate the prin-
ciples of fault tree construction using the RIKKE failure 
analysis system, and the FTLIB library of component failure 
models. The theory underlying the fault tree construction is 
given in "An algorithm for fault tree construction", J.R. 
Taylor, IEEE Trans. Reliability 1981, and in "Automatic fault 
tree and cause consequence diagram construction", J.R. Taylor 
and J.V. Olsen, 1978. Further examples of fault tree and 
consequence diagrams will follow in later compendia. 
The FTLIB library contains models of the common process plant 
and electrical components. It allows the causes of small and 
large process variable disturbances to be investigated. Small 
disturbances are defined as those which can be corrected by a 
control loop. Large disturbances can be corrected by shutting 
off or opening up various flows. 
In this volume, basic component configurations are investigated 
which illustrate the form of coding of models, and serve to 
document the basic models 
- resistive load 
- pipe 
- shut off valve 
- regulator valve 
- tank 
- tee junctions 
Generally, other models can be created from these basic models 
via a simple editing process, based on analogy for example 
between hydraulic and electric flow equations. As another 
example, a heat exchanger can be regarded as two pipes, with a 
heat exchange between them. 
In later volumes, more complex component arrangements are 
:nvestigated. 
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Model Coding Principles 
The list of variable values actually included are as follows 
large disturbance HI 
small disturbance DISTHI 
small disturbance DISTLO 
large disturbance LO 
absolute level ZERO/NO 
relative level NEG. 
absolute level ON 
abs lute level OFF 
Disturbance values are relative to normal values. These value 
level codes are combined with pref^ ~s and suffixes, in order 
to allow correct matching of variat 2 values in tracing event 
chains. For example LOSUPP is tne code for "low supply 
pressure". 
Additional zero values ATM (atmospheric), BLOCKED (shut against 
flow) and NOP (no pressure) are provided in order to be able to 
evaluate zero pressure and zero flow. Roughly, ATM means no 
pressure and no resistance to flow. BLOCKED means zero flow and 
infinite resistance to flow. NOP means no pressure supply is 
present. 
The principle underlying the construction of the FTLIB models 
are as follows. 
1) Disturbances are traced along flow paths in a component 
network. 
2) Transfer functions for components, which map input disturb-
ances to output disturbances are obtained by inspection of 
component physical equations of mass and energy balance, 
using the cause and effect graphs described in the refer-
ences. 
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3} Given a TOP event, the search used in building up the faul' 
tree has the f c Hewing pattern. 
upsteam 
cause of 
disturbance 
^ 
local or 
downstream 
conditions 
allowing 
disturbance 
I 
local or 
upstream 
conditions 
aliowing 
disturbance 
downstream 
cause of 
disturbance 
V v-
local disturbance 
4) The general pattern for flow and pressure disturbance is 
that some failure event affects pressure. The pressure 
disturbance is traced, and its effect on flow is derived 
locally within each component. Exceptions to this rule are 
disturbances arising from positive displacement pumps, and 
valve closure. 
5) It is not generally possible to determine the effect of a 
pressure disturbance without determining the resistance 
pattern it meets. A fall in pump speed may cause a fall in 
pressure if the pump is feeding a long pipe, or a fall in 
flow if the pump is feeding a tank directly. For this 
reason, changes in pressure or flow are not traced in 
building up the fault trees, but rather potential causes of 
changes in pressure or flow. For example LOSUPP means a low 
supply pressure, which is a potential cause of low pressure 
or low flow. HIBACKP means high back pressure, which is a 
potential cause of high pressure or low flow. The effect of 
the causes is determined locally within a component, e.g. 
(OUT-*HIBACKP) + (IN IS RESistive) ->(IN*HIP). 
6) The transfer function of a TEE junction presents difficult-
ies. The effect of a high supply pressure on the output will 
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depend on whether the output is resistive, and whether the 
second input flow is resistive. If the output is resistive, 
there will be no disturbance at the output unless the second 
input is resistive. In order to treat both the local and 
distant effects of wye junctions, disturbances are coded 
with the suffix -R if they can cause a disturbance in a 
resistive load, and a suffix -C if they can cause a 
disturbance in a capacitative load. 
7) Generally the component models have been minimised so that 
major branching in the resulting fault trees is found only 
at the TOP event and at TEE junctions. 
This is done by making the transformations 
A -X, B -X »>AB -X 
i.e. two causes of a disturbance are coded as a complex 
event. 
A + B-X, A + C-X»>B + C-Y , A + Y * X 
i.e. cause A, under conditions B and C, is investigated 
once, in combination with the complex condition B + C, 
rather than being investigated twice. 
8) For control components, disturbances only pass if there is 
no control action, for example 
(IN -DISTHISUPP) + (POS ISNT COMPLO) * (OUT *DISTHISUPP) 
Compensating actions are coded with the prefix COMP- for 
proportional control actions and DELTA- for derivative 
(fast; control actions. 
9) In order to avoid tracing causes of disturbances through a 
control system, and finding that a low disturbance is caused 
by a high disturbance, etc., which can rapidly lead to 
combinatorial explosion, high and iow control signals have 
the prefix CONT- or FAIL-, depending on whether the values 
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are caused by control actions or failures. Sensor components 
have the events IN • HI-INPUT and IN* L0-INPUT, to remind the 
user that the fault tree has been curtailed. In »ost cases 
the user will wish to delete these events. 
Examples 
The following comments are intended to highlight particular 
features of the examples, and should be read in parallel with 
examination of the examples. 
1) The system shown on page one is a collection of small 
component arrangements, intended to demonstrate the prin-
ciples of model construction. It includes a supply (SUP) of 
fluid, a sink (DRAIN) for fluid, NOZZLE which is a standard 
resistive flow load, an on off VALVE, a non-resistive PIPE, 
and a regulating valve REGVLV. 
2) The first fault tree is for high pressure (HIP) at the 
output of the NOZZLE, N3. The obvious sources og high 
pressure are the supply (HISUPP) and the drain (HIBACKP). 
Note that high supply pressure gives high pressure only if 
the output from N3 meets a resistive load (IS R). The 
nozzles have an additional failure mode FAILNOR which 
indicates that they become none resistive. 
The top event is given as IOUT*HIP. IOUT is an internal 
variable, corresponding to the external variable OUT. If 
event chains are to be searched in two directions then the 
top event in a fault tree should always represent a change 
in an internal variable when using RIKKE. 
3) The same fault tree as 2), after cutting (pruning), with 
mode 223, which removes almost all unnecessary parts of a 
fault tree. Intermediate events, and the "normal state" N4: 
NS BECOMES R have disappeared. 
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4) A fault tree similar to 2. but for low pressure. The FAILNOR 
failure modes are now found on trie downstream side of the 
top event. 
5} A fault tree similar to 2, but on the input side of the 
nozzle N3. 
6} As S, but cut with option 223, removing all superfluous 
event types. 
7) If the TOP event is HIP at the output of N4, the fault tree 
is similar to that of 2). But KIP is dependent on blockage 
in drain OS. 
8) High flow is also a possible top event, and in this case, 
is not dependent on the load being resistive. 
9) The top event is no pressure, NOP at the input of nozzle 
N3. 
10) The full fault tree for no pressure, NOP, at the output of 
nozzle N3. The first major branch of the tree, N3: U N 
BECOMES X involves an intermediate event intended to gather 
together NOSUPP and BLOCKED. Blockage and lock of supply 
are the causes of NOP here, and note that they are 
conditional on there being no back pressure. Generally 
drain DS would open to atmosphere, so that D5:WS ATM would 
be true, and the second branch of the first AND gate would 
disappear. 
The remaining branches of the tree investigate the possi-
bilities for the system to become open to the atmosphere. 
11) After cutting example 11, there still remaiti many gates in 
the NOP fault tree. Generally, the causes of NO pressure 
involve quite complex logical dependencies. 
12) The conditions for NOFLO are, in the first branch of this 
fault tree example similar to the conditions for NOP in 
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example IC. Sut in the remaining branches. BLOCKED is a 
cause of HOFLO, Mhereas in 10). *'JR5T is a cause of NOP. 
13} The examples notf take in the on-off valve VS. Note that we 
get low pressure downstrea« of VI only if the vaive remains 
open. If we close the valve the result is generally zero 
pressure (NOP), unless there is sew downstream source of 
pressure (SUP). Broken lines indicate an event without 
potential cause. 
14) High pressure at the output of on-off valve VS. Note the 
dependency on SUP again. On editing, the NOSUPPR branch of 
the tree will disappear, because there is no potential 
cause of N9: OUT BECOMES SU9. 
15) The causes of NOP, no pressure, at the output of shut off 
valve VS. 
16} Causes of NOFLO in VS. 
17) Causes of high pressure, HIP, at the outlet of control 
valve RV13. Note that if the position of the valve becomes 
failhi, high output pressure will result. But there is no 
potential cause of failhi in the model. (Broken lines 
around this event). This event is naturally included in the 
»odel for a valve actuator. 
Note also that a condition for high pressure in the first 
branch of the fault tree is that the valve is open, 
and rem* ins open. This condition provides a link t-. a 
potential control circuit input, although the cont-ol 
components are not included in the model. 
18) Low pressure at the valve outl-». 
19) K*iturbed low pressur*, T3TL0 »t the outlet of the 
regulating valve. Such silently low disturbances can be 
compensated by adjus'.ng M e valve position to COHPHI 
(compensating high). Because tnere is no control circuit, 
this possibility is shown with be ken line. 
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20) As for 19, but with DISTHIP. 
21) The no pressure case. 
22) The no flow case for the regulating valve. 
23) High pressure in the pipe. 
24) Zero pressure in the pipe. 
25) High flow in the pipe. 
26) No flow in the pipe. 
27) A new model is introduced, for the two types of tee 
junctions, mix and divide. 
28) High pressure at the mixer. Here the importance of the 
resistive condition R can be seen. All branches of the 
mixer junction must be resistive, if high pressure is to 
result from disturbances. 
29) No pressure at the mixer junction (after cutting, mode 
223). 
30) No pressure at the divider junction. 
31) A simple flow loop model is introduced with a transmitter 
and a pneumatic regulator. 
32) This example shows the result of investigating a disturb-
ance in the control loop. Loop failure modes are recorded. 
The fault tree has been cut, mode 223. 
33) As for 32, except that the disturbance is investigated 
further downstream. The fault tree has been cut with mode 
207, so intermediate events are shown. 
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34) Pressure disturbances at the outflow of tne control loop. 
The control loop has no effect on these, since it is 
designed to regulate flow. 
35) A new model is introduced, for tank level control. The 
input here is graphic, using the DRAFT comnand rather than 
the DIAGRAM command in RIKKE. 
36) Tank level control failure. 
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